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Originalism and Political Ignorance 
Ilya Somin†
  INTRODUCTION   
 
Original meaning originalism may now be the most popu-
lar version of constitutional theory in the legal academy. It has 
been endorsed by well-known conservative scholars such as 
Robert Bork, John McGinnis, Michael Stokes Paulsen, and Ste-
ven Calabresi,1
 
†  Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. For helpful 
suggestions and comments, I would like to thank Jack Balkin, David Bern-
stein, Michelle Boardman, Steve Calabresi, T.J. Chiang, Jamal Greene, Bruce 
Johnsen, John McGinnis, Michael Rappaport, David Schleicher, Mark 
Tushnet, the editors of the Minnesota Law Review, and participants in the 
University of San Diego annual Originalism Works in Progress conference, 
and the George Mason University School of Law Levy workshop. I would also 
like to thank Chaim Mandelbaum and Ryan Facer for helpful research assis-
tance. Copyright © 2012 by Ilya Somin. 
 libertarians such as Randy Barnett, Gary Law-
 1. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITI-
CAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 144 (1990); Steven G. Calabresi, A Critical Intro-
duction to the Originalism Debate, in ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF 
DEBATE 1, 12, 35 (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007) [hereinafter Calabresi, Intro-
duction] (arguing that constitutional interpretation should be based on “the 
original meaning of the constitutional text”); Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. 
Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2011); 
Steven G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin’s 
Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 663, 664, 701 (2009); Vasan Kesavan & Mi-
chael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret Draft-
ing History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1141–45 (2003); John O. McGinnis & Michael 
B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 TEX. L. REV. 703, 791 
(2002) [hereinafter McGinnis & Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitu-
tion]; Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Government of Adequate Powers, 31 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 991, 991 (2008) (“There is only one correct way to interpret 
the Constitution, and that is original public meaning textualism.”). McGinnis 
and Rappaport have more recently advanced the theory of “original methods 
originalism.” John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods 
Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construc-
tion, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 751 (2009) [hereinafter McGinnis & Rappaport, 
Original Methods Originalism]. However, I treat this is as a variant of “origi-
nal meaning.” See discussion infra Part I.A.2. 
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son, and Michael Rappaport,2 prominent left of center academ-
ics such as Akhil Amar, Jack Balkin, and James Ryan,3 and 
other leading scholars such as Larry Solum.4 It is also advocat-
ed by well-known originalist jurists such as Antonin Scalia and 
Clarence Thomas.5
Some leading scholars still reject original meaning 
originalism and continue to criticize the theory forcefully.
  
6 And 
a few originalists still adhere to the original intent school.7
 
 2. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: 
THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 89 (2004) [hereinafter BARNETT, RESTORING 
THE LOST CONSTITUTION]; Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for 
Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 620 (1999) [hereinafter Barnett, An 
Originalism for Nonoriginalists]; Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism 
as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47, 48 (2006) (arguing that the 
Constitution should be interpreted as understood by the “reasonable Ameri-
can” in 1788, the time of ratification); McGinnis & Rappaport, Our 
Supermajoritarian Constitution, supra note 
 But 
1, at 802–05. 
 3. See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 6–7 (2011) [hereinaf-
ter BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM]; Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document 
and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 28–29 (2000); Jack M. Balkin, Abor-
tion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 293 (2007) [hereinafter 
Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning]; Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning 
and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427 (2007) [hereinafter 
Balkin, Original Meaning]; James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the Constitution: 
The Promise of New Textualism, 97 VA. L. REV. 1523, 1524 (2011). Ryan de-
scribes the theory he and others endorse as “textualism.” But it is clear from 
the context that the version of textualism he has in mind is based on the origi-
nal public meaning of the text. He refers to “original meaning” as the newly 
dominant view in constitutional theory. Id. at 1524–26. 
 4. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 1–2 (Ill. Pub. Law 
& Legal Theory, Research Papers Series No. 07-24, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244. 
 5. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3075 (2010) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that we should return to the “original mean-
ing” of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, defined as “what the public most 
likely thought the Privileges or Immunities Clause to mean” at the time of en-
actment); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE LAW 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter SCALIA, INTERPRETA-
TION]; Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 
857 (1989). 
 6. See, e.g., DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 7–31 (2010); 
Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 8 (2009); 
Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 714 
(2011); Jack N. Rakove, Joe the Ploughman Reads the Constitution, or, the 
Poverty of Public Meaning Originalism, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 575, 583 (2011). 
 7. See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: 
TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 3 (1999); Larry 
Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You're Speaking?” Why In-
tention Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967, 
974–77 (2004). 
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there is little doubt that original meaning has attracted wide-
spread support in recent years. 
In contrast to original intent, which focuses on the person-
al intentions of the Framers, original meaning is usually inter-
preted as depending on the public understanding of the mean-
ing of a constitutional provision at the time of ratification. 
Justice Clarence Thomas, for example, describes the original 
meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause as “what the 
public most likely thought the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
to mean” when the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted.8 
Many other leading originalists define the concept in similar 
terms.9
This understanding of original meaning makes it im-
portant to determine what the public actually knew and under-
stood about the meaning of specific parts of the Constitution at 
the time they were enacted. If most voters knew little or noth-
ing about the constitutional provision in question, it may be dif-
ficult or impossible to determine its original meaning. At the 
very least, the original meaning might turn out to be very im-
precise, especially in cases where the text is ambiguous enough 
to admit more than one plausible interpretation.  
 
Survey data showing extensive public ignorance on even 
very basic political issues suggests that cases where the public 
has little knowledge of ambiguous parts of the Constitution at 
the time of ratification might well be common.10
 
 8. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3075 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 Yet none of the 
rapidly growing literature on original meaning has so far grap-
 9. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 1, at 144 (defining original meaning as 
“what the public of that time would have understood the words to mean”); 
Amar, supra note 3, at 29 (“What counts as text is the document as understood 
by the American People who ratified and amended it, and what counts as his-
tory is accessible public meaning, not secret private intent.”); see also Barnett, 
An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, supra note 2, at 620–21 (same). 
 10. See, e.g., SCOTT L. ALTHAUS, COLLECTIVE PREFERENCES IN DEMO-
CRATIC POLITICS 10–14 (2003) (summarizing evidence of extensive voter igno-
rance); MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW 
ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 62–104 (1996) (same); RICK 
SHENKMAN, JUST HOW STUPID ARE WE? FACING THE TRUTH ABOUT THE 
AMERICAN VOTER 13–36 (2008) (same); Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective on the Central Obsession of 
Constitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287, 1304–29 (2004) (same); Ilya 
Somin, Voter Ignorance and the Democratic Ideal, 12 CRITICAL REV. 413, 416–
19 (1998) [hereinafter Somin, Voter Ignorance] (same). For an extensive recent 
review, see ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE (forthcoming 
2013) (manuscript at ch. 1) (on file with author) [hereinafter SOMIN, DEMOC-
RACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE]. 
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pled with the reality of widespread public ignorance and its im-
plications for originalism.  
In this Article, I begin the task of filling the gap in the lit-
erature. Part I describes the ways in which various theories of 
original meaning implicitly depend on assumptions about pub-
lic knowledge. As a result, original meaning originalists must 
take account of the problem of political ignorance. This is fairly 
obvious in the case of theories that explicitly define original 
meaning as the understanding held by the public at the time.11 
But it also applies, in somewhat different form, to more com-
plex variants of originalism, such as John McGinnis and Mi-
chael Rappaport’s “original methods originalism,” which argues 
that provisions of the Constitution should be interpreted in ac-
cordance with the methodology expected at the time of enact-
ment.12 It is similarly relevant to Bruce Ackerman’s quasi-
originalist theory of “constitutional moments,” under which the 
relevant original meaning is determined during periods of con-
stitutional change that may not always involve formal constitu-
tional amendments.13
Political ignorance even turns out to be a potential problem 
for theories that base original meaning on the perspective of a 
hypothetical well-informed observer.
  
14 Although political igno-
rance is a less significant problem for original intent theories, it 
does create a challenge for Keith Whittington’s more populist 
approach to original intent, under which the relevant intent is 
that of the people rather than a small group of framers.15
Political ignorance also has implications for the theories of 
those scholars and jurists who believe that original meaning 
should be one of several factors in constitutional interpretation, 




 11. See sources cited supra note 
 To the extent that the original mean-
9. 
 12. See McGinnis & Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism, supra note 
1, at 751–52. 
 13. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 285–88 
(1991) (outlining his theory). 
 14. See, e.g., Lawson & Seidman, supra note 2, at 72–73 (theory based on 
a hypothetical well-informed observer); see also Kesavan & Paulsen, supra 
note 1, at 1144 (same). 
 15. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 7, at 110–59. 
 16. Even Supreme Court Justices who are not consistent originalists have 
sometimes used originalist arguments to justify their positions. See, e.g., Dis-
trict of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 641–70 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 101–16 (1996) (Souter, J., 
dissenting). Some nonoriginalist legal scholars also recognize that originalist 
arguments have at least a limited role to play in constitutional interpretation. 
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ing is a factor in their theories of constitutional interpretation, 
partial originalists will still have to consider the problem of po-
litical ignorance. 
In all of these cases, original meaning may be difficult or 
impossible to determine if voters at the time of ratification 
lacked adequate knowledge, which may not have been an unu-
sual state of affairs. The problem is most severe with respect to 
determining the original meaning of provisions that are rela-
tively vague and open-ended and least so when it comes to 
those that are relatively clear and precise.17
Unfortunately, the available empirical evidence on current 
political ignorance suggests that the public may well have been 
poorly informed about many constitutional issues at the time of 
ratification. Indeed, acquiring little or no political knowledge is 
actually rational behavior for most voters. 
 However, many of 
the most important disputes in constitutional law involve the 
former. The problem of political ignorance is also likely to be 
more acute with regard to issues that were not a major focus of 
public debate at the time of enactment.  
In Part II, I consider several possible solutions to the chal-
lenge posed by political ignorance. These include relying on the 
perceptions of political elites, looking to contemporary coverage 
of constitutional issues in the popular media, and assuming 
that the public divined an original meaning after all by relying 
on “information shortcuts.”  
Each of these approaches has some merit. But all of them 
also have important shortcomings. Ultimately, originalists may 
have to rely on a hybrid combination of all these methods to 
meet the challenge of political ignorance. Even so, there will be 
cases where the problem of political ignorance makes original 
meaning nearly impossible to divine. To address such situa-
tions, original meaning originalism may have to be supple-
mented by other interpretative methodologies. 
 
See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 11–13 (1980) (admitting that “interpretivist” originalism has some 
value and may be useful in interpreting some parts of the Constitution); Larry 
Kramer, Panel on Originalism and Pragmatism, in ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-
CENTURY OF DEBATE, supra note 1, at 158 (criticizing original meaning 
originalism, but noting that “[i]t does not follow that originalism is irrelevant. 
To solve a given problem, I am still going to want to start with the original de-
sign. . . . [T]he sensible way to think about constitutional interpretation is to 
begin with the original understanding.”). 
 17. See discussion infra Part I.D.1. 
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Part III briefly considers two ways in which originalists 
could respond to the challenge of political ignorance by modify-
ing their theories: adopting a presumption in favor of literal 
over figurative interpretations of constitutional text, and leav-
ing more issues to be resolved by construction rather than in-
terpretation. These strategies address the problem of political 
ignorance by modifying originalist theory itself, rather than by 
trying to work within its existing confines. 
This Article does not lay out a comprehensive theory of 
originalism or even a comprehensive statement of the ways in 
which originalists should deal with the problem of political ig-
norance. It does, however, begin the conversation about this 
important but so far neglected problem. 
I do not believe that the issue of political ignorance is a fa-
tal flaw of originalism. Indeed, I remain sympathetic to 
originalist theories of constitutional interpretation generally, 
and original meaning originalism in particular. However, polit-
ical ignorance does pose challenges to originalism that deserve 
greater attention from critics and defenders of the theory alike. 
I.  ORIGINAL MEANING AND THE CHALLENGE OF 
POLITICAL IGNORANCE   
Theories of original meaning rely on implicit assumptions 
about public knowledge of various constitutional provisions at 
the time of enactment. These assumptions are at least partially 
undermined if the majority of the public is in fact ignorant 
about the issue in question. Unfortunately, the available data 
on political knowledge suggests that such ignorance may well 
have been common. Widespread political ignorance also has 
important implications for at least some versions of original in-
tent theories. It has similar ramifications for nonoriginalist 
theories of interpretation that appeal to original meaning as 
one of several relevant factors in determining the meaning of 
the Constitution.  
A. ASSUMPTIONS OF KNOWLEDGE IN THEORIES OF ORIGINAL 
MEANING 
Theories of original meaning are based on implicit assump-
tions of public knowledge about relevant constitutional provi-
sions. This is most obvious in relatively simple formulations of 
theory, which interpret original meaning in terms of “what the 
public of that time would have understood the words to mean,” 
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as Robert Bork puts it.18 Many other prominent originalists 
have endorsed similar formulations, including Akhil Amar, 
Justice Clarence Thomas, and Randy Barnett.19
This version of originalism long predates the recent debate 
between advocates of original meaning and original intent. 
James Madison endorsed a similar view, arguing that the Con-
stitution should be interpreted in accordance with “the sense in 
which [it] was accepted and ratified by the nation,”
 They view orig-
inal meaning as what the public at the time of enactment be-
lieved the meaning to be.  
20 which he 
earlier described more precisely as “the sense attached to it by 
the people in their respective State Conventions where it recd. 
[sic] all the authority which it possesses.”21
Political ignorance may be less of an obstacle for theories of 
original meaning that do not focus primarily on the under-
standing of the general public at the time. But as we shall see, 
they do not avoid the problem entirely. 
 
1. Knowledge Prerequisites of Original Meaning Theories that 
Rely on the Actual Understanding of the Public 
This approach implicitly assumes several elements of 
knowledge on the part of the public at the time of ratification. 
First, it implies that the public knows that the relevant consti-
tutional provision has been enacted, or at least is under consid-
eration. A person who does not know about the Fourteenth 
Amendment is unlikely to have an opinion about its meaning. 
Second, it assumes that the public knows that the relevant pro-
vision applies to whatever issue happens to be under considera-
tion by the observer seeking to determine the original mean-
ing—for example, that the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is relevant to sex discrimination.22
In addition, the public must have some knowledge or un-
derstanding of how that particular issue would be resolved un-
der the Amendment. In the case of sex discrimination, they 
would need to have some understanding of what kind of sex 
  
 
 18. BORK, supra note 1, at 144. 
 19. See sources cited supra notes 2–5.  
 20. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 99 
(quoting Letter from James Madison to Henry Lee (June 25, 1824), in 9 THE 
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 191–92 (G. Hunt ed., 1910)). 
 21. Id. at 98 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Thomas Ritchie 
(Sept. 15, 1821), reprinted in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 
OF 1787, at 447–48 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937)). 
 22. See Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 1, passim (considering this issue). 
  
632 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:625 
 
discrimination is forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause, if 
any.  
The second and third requirements might to some extent 
be obviated by those versions of originalism that hold that the 
original meaning consists only of general principles or “seman-
tic” meanings rather than “originally expected applications.”23 
For example, Jack Balkin argues that originalism requires fi-
delity only to the “semantic meaning” of the words of the con-
stitutional text, defined as “the concepts that the words . . . re-
ferred to at the time the clause was originally enacted.”24 Thus, 
the Equal Protection Clause may refer to a general “anticaste” 
principle that forbids caste-like classifications regardless of 
whether the public at the time of enactment actually believed 
that sex discrimination was an example of the kind of discrimi-
nation forbidden by that principle.25 Professor Balkin himself 
argues that the Clause embodies a principle that bars “class 
legislation” as well as “caste legislation.”26
However, this reformulation reduces the relevant 
knowledge requirements only modestly. The public is still im-
plicitly assumed to understand what the relevant general prin-
ciple is and what criteria are used to determine whether a par-
ticular case falls under the principle or not.
  
27
Depending on the situation, understanding a general prin-
ciple may require as much, or greater, knowledge as under-
standing specific applications of a rule. Principles such as due 
process, nondiscrimination, and the anticaste principle have 
numerous complexities that have led to intense disagreements 
 In the case of sex 
discrimination and the Equal Protection Clause, the public 
would have to have known that the Clause adopts the anti-
caste principle and have some idea of what counts as a caste-
like legal distinction. Even if the public may not realize wheth-
er gender discrimination specifically is banned, the original 
public meaning surely includes some general sense of the crite-
ria by which we would go about answering such a question.  
 
 23. See, e.g., BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 3, at 13; Calabresi, 
Introduction, supra note 1, at 35; Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 1, at 42. 
 24. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 3, at 13. For a recent cri-
tique of Balkin’s emphasis on “abstract” general principles, see John O. 
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Abstract Meaning Fallacy, 2012 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 737. For Professor Balkin’s response, see Jack M. Balkin, Nine 
Perspectives on Living Originalism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 815, 822–29. 
 25. Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 1, at 20–27, 46–51. 
 26. Balkin, Original Meaning, supra note 3, at 450. 
 27. See id. at 452–53. 
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about their nature and scope even among experts.28
Some of the advocates of the public understanding theory 
modify it by suggesting that they are actually looking for the 
understanding of the “reasonable person” at the time. These in-
clude Randy Barnett and Justice Antonin Scalia.
 Shifting the 
focus from applications to principles reduces the need for public 
knowledge of specific cases, but increases the need for philo-
sophical understanding of general principles. 
29 This would 
narrow the inquiry to the views of those members of the public 
who are “reasonable.” However, a person can be reasonable 
without necessarily having much knowledge of law and politics. 
Therefore, the reasonable observer is not necessarily knowl-
edgeable unless being well-informed is built into the definition 
of what counts as reasonable. I address the latter approach lat-
er in the Article.30
The reasonable person might also be conceptualized as a 
hypothetical construct rather than any actually existing mem-
ber of the public.
  
31
The knowledge implications of this kind of originalism also 
apply to Professor Bruce Ackerman’s famous “constitutional 
moments” theory, under which constitutional change can be le-
gitimately implemented outside the Article V Amendment pro-
cess if it attracts sufficiently broad popular and elite support.
 But if this hypothetical individual is not as-
sumed to be knowledgeable by definition, he or she presumably 
would have knowledge limitations similar to those of actual 
members of the public at the time. Therefore public ignorance 
would still be a problem for a theory of original meaning that 
relies on the views of this type of hypothetical observer. 
32
 
 28. See, e.g., DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER chs. 3–6 
(2011) (describing the long history of expert disagreement over the meaning of 
“due process”); Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 
 
1, at 20–27, 46–66 (discussing 
the complexity of the anticaste principle); Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste 
Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2413–28 (1994) (describing three different 
understandings of the anticaste principle). 
 29. See, e.g., BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, 
at 92 (“‘[O]riginal meaning’ originalism seeks the public or objective meaning 
that a reasonable listener would place on the words used in the constitutional 
provision at the time of enactment.”); SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 5, 
at 17 (arguing that original meaning is “the intent that a reasonable person 
would gather from the text of the law”); see also Barnett, An Originalism for 
Nonoriginalists, supra note 2, at 621. 
 30. See discussion infra Part I.A.3. 
 31. See Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 1, at 1162. 
 32. See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 13, at 53–56; 2 BRUCE A. 
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 414–16 (1998) [hereinafter 
ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS]; Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Poli-
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Ackerman’s theory is a sort of originalism, insofar as it urges 
courts to interpret the Constitution on the basis of meanings 
established during past periods of constitutional change.33 The 
difference between Ackerman and traditional originalists is 
that, for him, the relevant periods where original meaning 
should be found are not exclusively those where the Constitu-
tion has been altered through the formal amendment process. 
Ackermanian constitutional moments can occur at other times 
as well.34
Ackerman contends that, during “constitutional moments,” 
the public pays heightened attention to constitutional issues 
and the resulting changes to the constitutional system are ones 
endorsed by majority public opinion
 
35—unlike policies adopted 
during periods of “normal politics,” when he recognizes most 
voters pay little attention.36 Thus, Ackerman’s theory relies 
crucially on the claim that the general public understood and 
endorsed the constitutional changes enacted during constitu-
tional moments.37
2. Knowledge Prerequisites of Original Methods Originalism 
  
Leading originalist scholars John McGinnis and Michael 
Rappaport have proposed an alternative approach to original 
meaning, which they call “original methods originalism.”38 In-
stead of relying on original public meaning directly, they argue 
that constitutional interpreters should use the “interpretive 
methods that the constitutional enactors would have deemed 
applicable to it” at the time of enactment.39
 
tics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 489–90 (1989) (discussing several 
examples of what could be considered “constitutional moments”). 
  
 33. Cf. Richard A. Primus, Judicial Power and Mobilizable History, 65 
MD. L. REV. 171, 178 n.17 (2006) (describing Ackerman as a “multiple 
originalist” because he recognizes several different historical periods as 
sources of original meaning); Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Hel-
ler and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 932 (2009) (noting that “Acker-
man's theory seemed to require an account of original meaning”). 
 34. See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 32, at pt. III (describ-
ing the New Deal “constitutional moment” of the 1930s, when no formal 
amendments occurred). 
 35. ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 13, at 285–88.  
 36. Id. at 272. 
 37. I discuss the knowledge implications of Ackerman’s theory in greater 
detail in Ilya Somin, Voter Knowledge and Constitutional Change: Assessing 
the New Deal Experience, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 595 (2003). 
 38. McGinnis & Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism, supra note 1, 
passim.  
 39. Id. at 751. 
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This theory can be seen as a variant on original public 
meaning, with the focus on the public’s original understanding 
of interpretive methodology rather than their understanding of 
substantive rules. Like more traditional versions of original 
meaning originalism, the original methods approach focuses on 
public understanding at the time of enactment and ratifica-
tion.40 McGinnis and Rappaport themselves argue that their 
theory is an alternative to original public meaning originalism 
rather than a subvariant of it.41
Original methods originalism shifts the knowledge burden 
from understanding of the substantive requirements of specific 
parts of the Constitution to knowledge of the rules by which 
those provisions are likely to be interpreted. The theory seems 
to assume that the enacting public had relevant knowledge of 
the interpretive rules that were expected to control future in-
terpretations of the constitutional provisions they had just 
adopted. 
 For my purposes, nothing turns 
on the distinction between these two descriptions of their theo-
ry. Even if it is not actually a form of original meaning 
originalism, original methods originalism has much in common 
with it. 
Under this approach, the public would have knowledge of 
the relevant interpretive rules that they expect to be used to in-
terpret a given constitutional provision. For example, the pub-
lic would know whether the Fourteenth Amendment is ex-
pected to be interpreted using textualism,42 originalist 
methodologies, “living Constitution” theories, pragmatic theo-
ries of interpretation,43
 
 40. Id. at 751–52. 
 or perhaps other options. The voters 
need not have an understanding of the full range of alterna-
tives. But they presumably do need to know which methodology 
is actually expected to be used to interpret the provision they 
have enacted and how it works. Otherwise, they cannot really 
be said to have “decided whether to vote for the Constitution 
 41. Id. at 761–65. 
 42. For a discussion of the difference between textualism and originalism, 
see Ilya Somin, “Active Liberty” and Judicial Power: What Should Courts Do to 
Promote Democracy?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1827, 1851–53 (2006) (reviewing 
STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTI-
TUTION (2005)). 
 43. For a defense of judicial pragmatism, see, for example, RICHARD A. 
POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003). 
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based on the meaning it would have had under the original in-
terpretive rules.”44
It is possible to interpret McGinnis and Rappaport’s theory 
as requiring only legal experts to have such knowledge, with 
the views of the general public largely irrelevant. McGinnis and 
Rappaport themselves suggest the possibility that the public 
might deliberately defer to the superior expertise of legal ex-
perts in determining what methods to use in interpreting a 
constitutional provision.
 
45 But they also emphasize that a key 
advantage of the original methods approach is that it uses 
those rules that were adopted in a supermajority process by the 
enactors: “The enactors would have decided whether to vote for 
the Constitution based on the meaning it would have had un-
der the original interpretive rules . . . . Severing the Constitu-
tion’s meaning from these rules gives effect to a different Con-
stitution than the one originally enacted.”46 They contend that a 
constitutional rule enacted by a supermajority process is more 
likely to be beneficial than one developed by other means, such 
as later judicial decision-making.47
3. Theories That Base Original Meaning on the Views of 
Hypothetical Well-Informed Observers 
 These benefits of 
supermajoritarianism seem to depend at least in part on the 
members of the supermajority understanding the interpretive 
methods they are voting for.  
Some theories of original meaning emphasize the views of 
hypothetical well-informed observers rather than the actual be-
liefs of the public at the time of ratification. For example, Mi-
chael Paulsen and Vasan Kesavan contend that original mean-
ing should be interpreted in light of the perceptions of an 
“ordinary, reasonably well-informed user of the language” at 
the time of enactment.48
 
 44. McGinnis & Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism, supra note 
 Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman rely 
1, 
at 782 (citation omitted). 
 45. Id. at 765. I discuss the implications of this idea in more detail infra 
Part I.D.3. 
 46. McGinnis & Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism, supra note 1, 
at 782–83 (citation omitted). 
 47. Id.; see also John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic 
Defense of Originalism, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 383, 388–89 (2007) (discussing the 
benefits of the supermajoritarian enactment of the original Constitution); 
McGinnis & Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, supra note 1, at 
785–90 (discussing the reasons for a supermajority requirement to amend the 
Constitution). 
 48. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 1, at 1144. 
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on an even better-informed hypothetical “reasonable person,” 
whom they describe as “conversant with legal traditions and 
conventions of the time” as well as “highly intelligent and edu-
cated and capable of making and recognizing subtle connections 
and inferences.”49 The Lawson-Seidman hypothetical arbiter of 
original meaning is, as they put it, “a formidable intellectual 
figure.”50
At first glance, it seems as if hypothetical observer theories 
of original meaning can avoid the problem of political ignorance 
altogether, simply by defining it away. Their hypothetical “rea-
sonable” person is well-informed by definition.  
 
The hypothetical observer version of originalism is indeed 
less vulnerable to the challenge of political ignorance than oth-
er approaches. But it does not avoid the problem entirely. 
Widespread political ignorance still creates significant difficul-
ties even for this version of original meaning originalism. 
Advocates of the hypothetical observer theory implicitly as-
sume that the well-informed reasonable observer is simply an 
ordinary member of the public with the addition of greater 
knowledge and intelligence. However, much research shows 
that increases in knowledge significantly alter attitudes to-
wards political issues. Survey respondents with high levels of 
political knowledge have very different views from those of the 
general population on a variety of political issues, even after 
controlling for numerous demographic and political variables, 
such as race, gender, income, age, and partisan identification.51
Thus, the increased knowledge of the hypothetical observer 
is also likely to affect his or her political attitudes, which in 
turn could easily influence their interpretations of ambiguous 
parts of the Constitution. We know that political ideology influ-




 49. Lawson & Seidman, supra note 
 and it is likely 
to do so among lay observers as well. To understand how the 
hypothetical well-informed observer is likely to interpret the 
Constitution, we need to consider the impact that increased po-
litical knowledge may have on his views. 
2, at 73. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See, e.g., ALTHAUS, supra note 10, at pt. III; BRYAN CAPLAN, MYTH OF 
THE RATIONAL VOTER: WHY DEMOCRACIES CHOOSE BAD POLICIES 50–93 
(2007); DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 10, at 218–67, 334–36. 
 52. For a summary of the relevant evidence, see JEFFREY A. SEGAL & 
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL RE-
VISITED (rev. ed. 2003). 
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Advocates of the hypothetical observer theory can try to ig-
nore this issue. They can model the hypothetical reasonable 
person as simply an individual with heightened political and 
legal knowledge whose normative views remain completely un-
changed. But this move increases the extent to which the hypo-
thetical observer is distanced from the general public whose 
understanding he or she is supposed to be a stand-in for. 
If the hypothetical observer is vastly more informed than 
the actual public at the time of ratification, using the former as 
a proxy for the latter risks undercutting many of the claimed 
advantages of original meaning originalism. For example, some 
scholars contend that originalist interpretations of the Consti-
tution are superior to the alternatives because the original 
meaning of a constitutional provision is the one that was enact-
ed by a supermajoritarian political process,53 or at least embod-
ies “popular sovereignty.”54
Other scholars defend original meaning originalism on the 
ground that it provides a binding framework for government 
that can extend across time,
 But if there is a great difference be-
tween the views of the knowledgeable hypothetical observer 
and those of the general public that ratified the relevant part of 
the Constitution in the real world, then the interpretation en-
dorsed by the former is probably not the one that succeeded in 
getting supermajority political support. Nor is it a product of 
popular sovereignty. Perhaps only a tiny fraction of the general 
public actually held the same views as the hypothetical observ-
er, or even was aware that such an interpretation was a logical 
possibility.  
55 or that it “locks in” important 
features of the Constitution against change adopted by means 
other than the amendment process.56
 
 53. See generally McGinnis & Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Consti-
tution, supra note 
 It is not clear, however, 
why we would want to adopt a framework that reflects the 
views of a purely hypothetical observer, or lock in her hypothet-
ical preferences if they have little or no connection to the views 
of actual living people who adopted the Constitution and its 
amendments.  
1, at 785–90 (discussing the reasons for a supermajority re-
quirement to amend the Constitution). 
 54. Amar, supra note 3, at 37–38. 
 55. See, e.g., BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 3, at ch. 3. 
 56. See, e.g., BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, 
at 103–09. 
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Perhaps the views of the hypothetical well-informed ob-
server are to be preferred precisely because of his or her supe-
rior knowledge. People with greater political and legal 
knowledge are likely to adopt better rules than those with 
less.57 But if that is the true rationale for adopting the hypo-
thetical observer’s viewpoint, why not simply follow whatever 
legal rules a hypothetical well-informed observer would wish to 
impose, regardless of whether they happen to accord with the 
Constitution? For example, we could urge judges and other con-
stitutional interpreters to impose whatever rules would be 
adopted by highly knowledgeable observers in a hypothetical 
social contract framework, such as John Rawls’s famous “origi-
nal position.”58
In sum, the informed hypothetical observer theory does not 
completely avoid the problem of political ignorance. If there is a 
large gap between the hypothetical observer’s knowledge and 
that of the general public, reliance on the former as the basis of 
constitutional interpretation cuts against the major rationales 
for adopting original meaning originalism in the first place.  
  
B. IMPLICATIONS OF IGNORANCE FOR ORIGINAL INTENT 
On the whole, political ignorance is far less of a problem for 
the original intent version of originalism than for original 
meaning. In contrast to original meaning’s emphasis on the 
understanding of the general public, most theories of original 
intent focus on the views of a small elite of constitutional fram-
ers.59
 
 57. I argue for this idea in SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNO-
RANCE, supra note 
 On average, these elites are likely to be highly knowl-
edgeable about the constitutional issues they addressed. It is 
not likely that that they lacked a clear intent on a key issue be-
cause they were simply ignorant about it. But this possibility 
cannot be categorically ruled out. Even generally well-informed 
elites might still be ignorant about the implications of a new 
10, at Introduction (explaining that effective democratic 
accountability requires voters to have at least some political knowledge). See 
generally CAPLAN, supra note 51. 
 58. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3–40 (1971) (laying 
out the philosophical underpinnings for such a theory). For other well-known 
hypothetical social contract theories, see JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON 
TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY 
AGREEMENT (1986). 
 59. For examples of the standard approach to original intent, see general-
ly RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); CALVIN H. JOHNSON, RIGHTEOUS ANGER AT 
THE WICKED STATES: THE MEANING OF THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION (2005). 
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part of the Constitution for some issues, especially if those is-
sues were not a major focus of attention at the time of ratifica-
tion. 
Moreover, at least one prominent version of original intent 
theory has a less elite-centric focus. Keith Whittington, a lead-
ing constitutional theorist, has advocated a version of original 
intent that links the concept to popular sovereignty and takes 
into account the intentions of the people as a whole.60 In Whit-
tington’s view, originalism should be based on the “sovereign 
intent” of the “popular will.”61
This populist version of original intent has close affinities 
with original meaning. Both shift the focus of interpretive at-
tention from a small, elite group of framers to the general pub-
lic; both implicitly assume a degree of knowledge on the part of 
the latter. For these reasons, political ignorance is a potential 
problem for the popular sovereignty model of original intent in 
much the same way as for original meaning originalism. More 
generally, the wider the range of people whose intent is consid-
ered relevant, the more likely it is that political ignorance is go-
ing to be a factor. 
  
C. ASSESSING THE RELEVANT EXTENT OF POLITICAL IGNORANCE 
Original meaning originalism’s implicit dependence on 
public political knowledge may not be a problem if knowledge 
levels are relatively high. In reality, however, the evidence sug-
gests that they are often quite low. Both general political 
knowledge and constitutional knowledge in particular leave 
much to be desired.  
1. Political Ignorance in the Modern Era 
Decades of survey data reveal that the majority of the pub-
lic is at a very low level of political knowledge.62
 
 60. WHITTINGTON, supra note 
 Majorities are 
often ignorant of very basic facts about politics and public poli-
cy. In the immediate aftermath of the 2010 election, only 46% 
of adults knew that the Republicans won the House of Repre-
7, at 110–59. 
 61. Id. at 155 (arguing that originalism preserves popular will and ad-
heres to sovereign intent). 
 62. See supra text accompanying note 10, and infra text accompanying 
note 71 (summarizing evidence of extensive voter ignorance). 
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sentatives, but not the Senate.63 In 2004, 70% of the public 
were unaware of the enactment of President George W. Bush’s 
prescription drug plan, the largest new federal program in dec-
ades.64 A 2009 poll showed that only 24% of Americans realized 
that an important “cap-and-trade” proposal then recently 
passed by the House of Representatives as an effort to combat 
global warming was an “environmental” policy.65 Some 46% be-
lieved that it was either a “health care reform” or a “regulatory 
reform for Wall Street.”66
Ignorance about basic aspects of the Constitution is also 
extensive. For example, a 2006 Zogby poll found that 58% of 
Americans cannot name the three branches of the federal gov-
ernment.
  
67 Only 28% can name two or more of the five rights 
guaranteed by the First Amendment.68 The majority also does 
not know which branch of government has the power to declare 
war.69 According to a 2002 survey, only 31% realize that Karl 
Marx’s famous dictum “from each according to his ability, to 
each according to his needs” is not in the Constitution.70
Such widespread ignorance is not a recent phenomenon. It 
dates back many decades to the very beginning of modern pub-




 63. Public Knows Basic Facts About Politics, Economics, but Struggles 
with Specifics, PEW RES. CENTER FOR PEOPLE & PRESS, Nov. 18, 2010, at 1, 
available at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/677.pdf. 
 A 1952 survey found that only 
 64. See Ilya Somin, When Ignorance Isn’t Bliss: How Political Ignorance 
Threatens Democracy, 525 POL’Y ANALYSIS, Sept. 22, 2004, at 5–6, available at 
http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/when-ignorance-isnt-bliss 
-how-political-ignorance-threatens-democracy. 
 65. National Survey of 1,000 Likely Voters, RASMUSSEN REP. (May 7–8, 
2009), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/toplines/pt_ 
survey_toplines/may_2009/toplines_cap_trade_i_may_7_8_2009. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Brit Hume, Zogby Poll: Most Americans Can Name Three Stooges, but 
not Three Branches of Gov’t, FOX NEWS (Aug. 15, 2006), http://foxnews.com/ 
story/0,2933,208577,00.html. 
 68. Americans’ Awareness of First Amendment Freedoms, MCCORMICK 
TRIB. FREEDOM MUSEUM (Mar. 1, 2006), http://www.forumforeducation.org/ 
node/147. 
 69. DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 10, at 70. 
 70. Michael C. Dorf, Whose Constitution Is It Anyway? What Americans 
Don’t Know About Our Constitution—and Why It Matters, FINDLAW (May 29, 
2002), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20020529.html. 
 71. For studies showing the consistency of political ignorance over time, 
see generally DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 10, at 62–134; ERIC R.A.N. 
SMITH, THE UNCHANGING AMERICAN VOTER (1989); Stephen E. Bennett, 
“Know-Nothings” Revisited Again, 18 POL. BEHAV. 219, 219–31 (1996); Ste-
phen E. Bennett, “Know-Nothings” Revisited: The Meaning of Political Igno-
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19% of Americans could name all three branches of the federal 
government and only 27% could name at least two, an even 
worse level of knowledge than today.72 Overall, knowledge lev-
els have not increased significantly even in the wake of the 
technological revolution in information technology wrought by 
the internet and modern cable television.73
2. Political Ignorance in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth 
Centuries 
  
Obviously, modern evidence of political ignorance is only 
indirectly relevant to the historical periods when the original 
Constitution and its most important amendments were enact-
ed: 1787–91 in the case of the original Constitution and the Bill 
of Rights, and 1865–70 for the three Reconstruction amend-
ments. Were political knowledge levels higher back then than 
they are today? It is impossible to answer this question with 
any certainty because we do not have systematic public opinion 
polling for any period prior to the 1930s.74
 
rance Today, 69 SOC. SCI. Q. 476, 476–92 (1988); Stephen E. Bennett, Trends 
in Americans’ Political Information, 1967–1987, 17 AM. POL. Q. 422 passim 
(1989); Michael X. Delli Carpini & Scott Keeter, Stability and Change in the 
U.S. Public’s Knowledge of Politics, 55 PUB. OPINION Q. 583, 590–93 (1991). 
For an exception showing a very small increase in knowledge when comparing 
the 1980–88 period to the 1990–98 period, see ALTHAUS, supra note 
 There is no eight-
eenth and nineteenth century political knowledge data compa-
rable to that which exists for the last seventy-five years.  
10, at 215. 
The increase shown in Althaus’s study is very small (from an average of 52% 
correct answers in the earlier period to 54% in the later one), and may be an 
artifact of the particular questions studied. Id. For evidence of widespread po-
litical ignorance during the 1930s, see Somin, supra note 37, at 620–28. 
 72. DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 10, at 71. 
 73. See, e.g., Public Knowledge of Current Affairs Little Changed by News 
and Information Revolutions, article in What Americans Know: 1989–2007, 
PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR PEOPLE & PRESS (Apr. 15, 2007), http://www 
.people-press.org/2007/04/15/public-knowledge-of-current-affairs-little-changed 
-by-news-and-information-revolutions (showing little or no increase in political 
knowledge since the rise of the internet and other modern media); see also 
BRUCE BIMBER, INFORMATION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: TECHNOLOGY IN 
THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL POWER 229–30 (2003) (arguing little or no in-
crease in political knowledge since the rise of the internet and other modern 
media); MATTHEW HINDMAN, THE MYTH OF DIGITAL DEMOCRACY 60–61 
(2009). See generally Markus Prior, News vs. Entertainment: How Increasing 
Media Choice Widens Gaps in Political Knowledge and Turnout, 49 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 577 (2005).  
 74. See JOHN G. GEER, FROM TEA LEAVES TO OPINION POLLS 5 (1996) (de-
scribing origins of public opinion polling in the 1930s). 
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Nonetheless, there is at least some reason to doubt that po-
litical knowledge levels in eighteenth and nineteenth century 
America were especially high. One of the main reasons why po-
litical ignorance has proven to be so persistent over time is 
that, for most citizens, it is actually rational behavior.75 Be-
cause the chance of any one vote influencing the outcome of an 
election is infinitesimally small, there is little or no incentive to 
become knowledgeable about politics if the only reason for do-
ing so is to become a “better” voter.76 The rationality of wide-
spread political ignorance helps explain why it has persisted for 
decades despite impressive increases in education levels and in 
the availability of information through various types of media.77
Although the cost of acquiring information has declined 
thanks to modern technology, it is still high enough to make it 
rational for most citizens to remain ignorant about most issues; 
the key constraint on political knowledge is not the availability 
of information, but citizens’ willingness to spend time and en-
ergy learning and understanding it.
  
78
At the time of ratification, some of the Founding Fathers 
themselves believed that public knowledge of politics was low 
and, worried about allowing too much public influence over pol-
icy.
 Rational ignorance may 
have been an even greater barrier to information acquisition in 
an era when information was more difficult to find than today, 
literacy levels were much lower, and most people had to work 




 75. See SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 10, at 
ch. 3 (arguing that because one person’s vote has only an infinitesimal chance 
of affecting the outcome of an election, voters remain ignorant).  
 When the Constitution came up for ratification in Virgin-
ia, James Madison wrote in a letter to Thomas Jefferson that 
the issue at hand “certainly surpasses the judgment of the 
 76. See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 238–59 
(1957) (introducing the theory of rational political ignorance). For recent de-
fenses and extensions of the theory, see generally CAPLAN, supra note 51, at 
114–41; SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 10, at 
chs. 2–3, discussing the extent of voter ignorance and why this is rational be-
havior for most voters; and Ilya Somin, Knowledge About Ignorance: New Di-
rections in the Study of Political Information, 18 CRITICAL REV. 255, 257–60 
(2006), discussing low individual utility of political knowledge for most voters. 
 77. For a detailed discussion of this point, see SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND 
POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 10, at ch. 3. 
 78. See id. at chs. 2, 4 (surveying the evidence in detail). 
 79. See BENJAMIN I. PAGE & ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, THE RATIONAL PUBLIC 3 
(1992) (describing the Founders’ attitudes on this subject). 
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greater part of” the people of Virginia,80 though he also was 
pleased that the people decided “contrary to their most popular 
leaders,” many of whom were opposed to ratification.81
Some readers may assume that the voters who chose dele-
gates for the state ratifying conventions in 1787–88 were highly 
knowledgeable because the franchise was tightly restricted. 
However, the franchise was actually quite broad at the time.
 
82 
By 1790, some 60–70% of white adult males were legally al-
lowed to vote, even in spite of laws in many states that limited 
the franchise to property owners.83 Moreover, eight of the thir-
teen states lowered their property qualifications for the ratify-
ing convention election, and two others already had laws allow-
ing “virtually all” taxpaying adult male citizens to vote.84 Free 
black males had the franchise on the same terms as whites in 
five states.85 Despite the exclusion of women and most African-
Americans, states did not restrict the ratifying convention elec-
torate to a small, highly knowledgeable elite. By the 1860s, the 
period when the post-Civil War amendments were ratified, the 
franchise was broader still.86
The autonomous decision-making of late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth century voters was to some degree restricted 





 80. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 9, 1787), in 8 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: VIRGINIA 227 (John P. 
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1988) [hereinafter Madison Letter to 
Jefferson]. 
 The implications of deference for political 
knowledge are ambiguous. On the positive side, one can view 
deferential voters as being guided by the potentially superior 
knowledge of elites. The knowledge of the latter could poten-
 81. Id. 
 82. See ALEX KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 24 (2000). 
 83. Id. at 54–60. 
 84. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION 7, 503–05 (2005) 
(detailing property qualifications by state). The three exceptions were Rhode 
Island, Delaware, and Virginia. Id. at 505. 
 85. This was famously pointed out by Justice Benjamin Curtis in his dis-
sent in the Dred Scott case. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 572–73 
(1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting). 
 86. See KEYSSAR, supra note 82, at 50–52 (detailing substantial liberaliza-
tion of franchise laws in the 1820s–1850s). 
 87. See, e.g., Ronald P. Formisano, Deferential-Participant Politics: The 
Early Republic’s Political Culture, 1789–1840, 68 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 473 
(1974) (describing how “deferential politics” was only slowly displaced by the 
rise of political parties). 
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tially be imputed to the former. On the other hand, deference 
makes it less likely that voters would acquire and consider sub-
stantial information about constitutional issues on their own. It 
is also unclear whether voters who participated in the elections 
for ratifying convention delegates actually did behave in a def-
erential manner.88
Possibly the most thorough modern study of American po-
litical engagement in the nineteenth century, Glenn Altschuler 
and Stuart Blumin’s Rude Republic, finds that “the majority of 
enfranchised citizens . . . turned only episodically and often in 
qualified ways to political matters” and generally displayed 
relatively low levels of interest in political issues.
 
89 The crises of 
secession and the Civil War may have led to an increase in po-
litical engagement.90 But even during the war, a large propor-
tion of voters may have been “indifferen[t] to party tickets and 
platforms,” demonstrating little knowledge of issues.91 After the 
war—the period when the Fourteenth Amendment was enact-
ed—engagement may have returned to its previous, lower lev-
els.92 Other scholars contend that most nineteenth century vot-
ers based their decisions on “ethnocultural” affinity with their 
preferred political party rather than detailed consideration of 
issues.93
 
 88. See, e.g., Madison Letter to Jefferson, supra note 
 To the extent this was true, it makes it less likely that 
they considered constitutional issues in any depth. 
80, at 227 (express-
ing his opinion that they did not have such deference, and indeed voted con-
trary to the judgment of “their most popular leaders”). 
 89. GLENN C. ALTSCHULER & STUART M. BLUMIN, RUDE REPUBLIC: 
AMERICANS AND THEIR POLITICS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 272 (2000) 
[hereinafter ALTSCHULER & BLUMIN, RUDE REPUBLIC]. For other studies 
reaching similar conclusions, see RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE AMERICAN 
BALLOT BOX IN THE MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY, at ix (2004) (noting that “or-
dinary men” had a limited understanding of and interest in politics); RICHARD 
J. JENSEN, GRASS ROOTS POLITICS: PARTIES, ISSUES, AND VOTERS, 1854–1983, 
at 29–35 (1983) (claiming that narrow material incentives, rather than careful 
consideration of issues, often motivated nineteenth-century voters); Glen C. 
Altschuler & Stuart M. Blumin, Limits of Political Engagement in Antebellum 
America: A New Look at the Golden Age of Participatory Democracy, 84 J. AM. 
HIST. 855 passim (1997); Samuel DeCanio, State Autonomy and American Po-
litical Development: How Mass Democracy Promoted State Power, 19 STUD. 
AM. POL. DEV. 117, 118–21 (2005) (arguing that public ignorance in the nine-
teenth century was widespread). 
 90. ALTSCHULER & BLUMIN, RUDE REPUBLIC, supra note 89, at 155–60. 
 91. Id. at 177. 
 92. See generally id. at 184–251. 
 93. For a discussion of this literature, see Ronald P. Formisano, The In-
vention of the Ethnocultural Interpretation, 99 AM. HIST. REV. 473 passim 
(1994), and see also BENSEL, supra note 89, at 290, for an argument that such 
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Altschuler and Blumin’s work relies on qualitative evi-
dence such as contemporary diaries and newspaper reports.94 It 
is therefore difficult to tell whether or not their sources are ful-
ly representative of general popular attitudes. Instead, it may 
be that these sources actually overstate levels of political 
knowledge. The sorts of literate men95 who kept regular diaries 
and read political coverage in the press were likely to have 
been more knowledgeable than the average voter. Like James 
Madison in 1787,96 future president Rutherford B. Hayes wrote 
in 1875 that American democracy often amounted to “rule by 
ignorance,” especially in areas with a “large uneducated popu-
lation.”97
At the same time, some factors suggest that political 
knowledge might have been higher in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries than today. Government was considerably 
smaller and simpler in that era than in the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries, which meant that there were far fewer 
issues for voters to keep track of.
  
98
Similarly, the quantity, quality, and variety of public en-
tertainment in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was 
generally far lower than today. Nineteenth-century Americans 
did not have television, radio, movies, the internet, or (until the 
1870s) large-scale professional sports.
 As a result, the average 
amount of knowledge per issue might have been higher than 
today, even if the total amount of knowledge across all issues 
was not. This would tend to increase knowledge of constitu-
tional issues at the time of ratification, since these matters 
would have fewer competitors for public attention than they 
would today.  
99
 
affinities were often more important determinants of voting decisions than is-
sue platforms. 
 As a result, many peo-
ple attended political speeches and lectures in part as a form of 
 94. ALTSCHULER & BLUMIN, RUDE REPUBLIC, supra note 89, at 142–46. 
 95. I refer to men here because only men had the right to vote at the time.  
 96. See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text. 
 97. DeCanio, supra note 89, at 126 n.82 (quoting Letter from R. Hayes to 
J. Sherman (June 29, 1875), in 3 THE DIARY AND LETTERS OF RUTHERFORD B. 
HAYES 262 (1922), available at ww2.ohiohistory.org/onlinedoc/hayes). 
 98. I emphasized this point in Somin, Voter Ignorance, supra note 10, at 
434–35.  
 99. The National League—the first major professional sports league—was 
founded in 1876. See GEORGE VECSEY, BASEBALL: A HISTORY OF AMERICA’S 
FAVORITE GAME 31 (2006). 
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entertainment.100 The Lincoln-Douglas debates, for example, 
drew large audiences who came in part for that reason.101 One 
study claims that “half or more of the [mid-nineteenth century] 
population” attended political speeches, rallies, picnics, and pa-
rades.102
Even if political knowledge in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries was significantly higher than today, it still 
might not have translated into substantial public awareness of 
the sorts of complex issues that interest modern jurists and 
constitutional theorists. The average citizen in 1868 might well 
have understood that the Fourteenth Amendment was intend-
ed to protect the rights of recently freed African-Americans in 
some general sense. But that does not mean he had any clear 
idea of the full range of rights protected by the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause, whether the Amendment banned all racial 
discrimination by state governments or just some types,
 
103 or 
whether the Equal Protection Clause was meant to establish a 
general “anticaste principle.”104
More research is needed to better understand the extent of 
public knowledge on constitutional issues at the time when the 
Constitution and its most important amendments were ratified. 
At this point, the available evidence suggests that knowledge 
levels were likely to have been relatively low. However, it is 
certainly possible that future research will find important ex-
ceptions to this generalization, or potentially even overturn it. 
 
D. VARIATION ACROSS ISSUES 
Political ignorance is likely to be more of a problem for 
originalists on some issues than others. It is least likely to mat-
ter when it comes to interpreting constitutional provisions that 
are clear and precise and those that were widely debated at the 
time of enactment.105 The implications of ignorance may also 
differ as between those parts of the Constitution that use tech-
nical legal language and ones that do not.106
 
 100. See, e.g., JENSEN, supra note 
 
89, at 31 (suggesting that these activities 
were as much a form of entertainment as golf, tennis, and skiing are today). 
 101. ALLEN C. GUELZO, LINCOLN AND DOUGLAS: THE DEBATES THAT DE-
FINED AMERICA, at xvii–xviii (2009). 
 102. JENSEN, supra note 89, at 31. 
 103. See generally ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION (1991) 
(describing controversy over this issue at the time of ratification). 
 104. See sources cited supra note 28. 
 105. See discussion infra Part I.D.1. 
 106. See discussion infra Part I.D.3. 
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1. Textual Ambiguity 
Ignorance is less likely to be a problem for determining the 
original meaning of clear and precise parts of the Constitution, 
as opposed to more ambiguous ones. For example, Article II of 
the Constitution sets out very clear qualification requirements 
for the presidency, mandating that the president must be thir-
ty-five years old, a “natural born” American citizen, and a resi-
dent of the United States for at least fourteen years.107 Even a 
voter with little or no knowledge of politics is unlikely to have 
any difficulty interpreting this provision, despite the attempts 
of a few legal scholars to claim that it is more complex than it 
seems.108 It is possible, of course, that many people at the time 
of ratification might simply have been unaware of the existence 
of a clause in the Constitution setting out qualifications for the 
presidency. But at least anyone who read the clause was likely 
to have a clear sense of its meaning, even if they knew little or 
nothing about contemporary law and politics. The same goes for 
many other parts of the Constitution that are similarly unam-
biguous. For example, it is easy to grasp the meaning of the re-
quirement that each state is entitled to two senators,109 or that 
the president serves a four-year term110 and can only be reelect-
ed once after serving a complete first term.111
The situation is very different for those clauses that use 
broad or ambiguous language. For example, the text of the 
Equal Protection Clause does not clearly indicate what types of 
discrimination are forbidden, either with respect to the range of 
issues covered or the types of classifications that are to be 
banned. Both questions have been much debated by legal 





 107. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
 Similarly, Article II of the Constitution does not clearly 
 108. See, e.g., Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1151, 1174 (1985) (suggesting that scholars could interpret the age re-
quirement to mean merely that the president must have at least as much ma-
turity as the average thirty-five-year-old). 
 109. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. 
 110. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
 111. U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1. 
 112. See, e.g., Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 138–39 (1872) (unsuccessful 
early effort to argue that the Fourteenth Amendment forbade discrimination 
against women, but that argument was nonetheless endorsed by the Supreme 
Court Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase); KULL, supra note 103, at 67–112 (de-
scribing some of the debates on these issues at the time of the framing and 
soon after). 
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specify the limits of the president’s wartime executive powers. 
Scholars and jurists are deeply divided over the question of 
what the original meaning requires here. Some endorse a very 
broad interpretation of executive authority, while others argue 
for a much narrower one.113 These include such issues as 
whether the president has the power to begin an armed conflict 
without congressional consent, and whether he needs congres-
sional authorization to take such measures as trying prisoners 
in military commissions.114
The First Amendment does not clearly specify what forms 
of expression are protected by the Free Speech Clause.
  
115 As a 
result, there is great disagreement over such issues as whether 
the original meaning of the Clause protects symbolic expres-
sion,116 and whether it protects speech by corporations as well 
as “natural” persons.117
Many more such examples can be cited. The key point is 
that a large proportion of the most contentious issues in consti-
tutional interpretation are cases where the text does not pro-
vide a clear indication of original meaning by itself. To address 
this problem, scholars and jurists have to resort to extrinsic ev-
idence of meaning, such as tradition, precedent, statements by 
legal and political elites, and so on. These are precisely the 
sorts of evidence that relatively ignorant voters might not have 
been aware of at the time of ratification. While even a voter 
with little or no political knowledge can easily discern the 
meaning of a constitutional provision that is simple and clear, 
the same is not true of more complex and ambiguous clauses.  
  
 
 113. Compare MICHAEL RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS (2007) (arguing for a narrow interpretation), with JOHN YOO, THE 
POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 
9/11 (2005) (defending a very broad interpretation). 
 114. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732–33 (2008) (latest of 
several closely divided Supreme Court decisions on the military commission 
issue); RAMSEY, supra note 113, at 91–114 (arguing that the original meaning 
supports a relatively narrow interpretation of wartime executive power); YOO, 
supra note 113, at 143–81 (defending broad interpretation).  
 115. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 116. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Symbolic Expression and the Original Mean-
ing of the First Amendment, 97 GEO. L.J. 1057 (2009) (challenging the conven-
tional wisdom that the original meaning did not protect symbolic expression). 
 117. See generally Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (resulting 
in a closely divided 5-4 decision on this issue where the majority and dissent 
disagreed on the original meaning of the First Amendment, among other dis-
puted points). 
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This is not to say that low-knowledge voters are necessari-
ly completely ignorant about the latter. A low-knowledge voter 
might still have at least a general sense of a clause’s meaning. 
For example, he or she might realize that the Free Speech 
Clause of the First Amendment protects political speech 
against flagrant attempts at censorship by the government,118 
or that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the most blatant 
forms of state government discrimination against African-
Americans, such as the “Black Codes” that many southern 
states enacted in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War.119
Given the evidence suggesting that much of the public in 
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries is often ignorant about 
even very basic political information,
  
120
2. Prominence of Issues at the Time of Ratification 
 we cannot take for 
granted the idea that most voters at the time of ratification un-
derstood even relatively simple elements of the amendments 
that were being enacted. But it is at least plausible to believe 
that many did understand these points—or least would have 
easily grasped them upon reading the constitutional text. By 
contrast, public knowledge of more complex points that are not 
immediately evident in the text is likely to have been signifi-
cantly lower.  
Ignorance is also especially likely to be a problem in the 
case of interpretive questions that were not widely discussed at 
the time of enactment but which have become important since. 
These include such crucial modern issues as how the First 
Amendment applies to new technology121 and whether Con-
gress’s powers under the Commerce Clause extend to the regu-
lation of activity that is remote from actual trade and move-
ment across state lines.122
 
 118. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 
 119. See, e.g., THEODORE B. WILSON, THE BLACK CODES OF THE SOUTH 61–
80, 96–115 (1965) (describing the Black Codes). For a discussion on the role of 
the Black Codes in inspiring the Fourteenth Amendment, see, for example, 
AMAR, supra note 84, at 383–85. 
 120. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 121. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969) (hold-
ing that the First Amendment allows for greater regulation over the new 
technology of television). 
 122. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 32–33 (2005) (holding that the 
Commerce Clause allows Congress to forbid the possession of medical mariju-
ana even in cases where the marijuana had never crossed state lines or been 
sold in any market anywhere). 
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The implications of the Fourteenth Amendment for racial 
discrimination were widely debated at the time of ratification, 
making it more likely that members of the public would have at 
least some relevant knowledge on this issue.123 By contrast, 
there was much less debate about the potential impact of the 
Amendment for gender discrimination,124
3. Technical Legal Terms Versus Ordinary Language Terms 
 and almost none at all 
for discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Public ig-
norance would therefore be more of an obstacle to efforts to de-
termine the original meaning of the Amendment with respect 
to the latter two issues. 
Initially, it may seem obvious that political ignorance is 
likely to be more of a problem when it comes to the original 
meaning of many technical legal phrases in the Constitution 
than with respect to those clauses that use ordinary language. 
Phrases such as “Bill of Attainder,”125 “privileges or immuni-
ties,”126 and “Habeas Corpus”127
However, it is possible that legal terms of art actually cre-
ate less of a challenge than those clauses of the Constitution 
that use ordinary language. If a phrase in the Constitution 
looks like a technical term, ordinary citizens might assume that 
it is a legal term of art that they can leave to the experts to in-
terpret. They could deliberately decide to delegate the task of 
interpreting it to judges and other legal experts.
 are likely to be unintelligible to 
voters lacking in legal training. If so, the presence of many 
such legal terms of art in the Constitution could exacerbate the 
problem of political ignorance from the standpoint of original 
meaning. 
128 In that 
event, the original meaning might simply be that interpretation 
of the term is to be left up to judges using professional interpre-
tive tools.129
 
 123. See KULL, supra note 
 
103, at 67–87 (discussing the extensive delibera-
tion that led to the creation of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 124. For a recent review of the evidence, see Calabresi & Rickert, supra 
note 1, at 51–57. 
 125. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
 126. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 127. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 128. See McGinnis & Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism, supra note 
1, at 765 (asserting that the public might allow lawyers to determine the 
meaning of certain aspects of the Constitution). 
 129. Id. at 772. 
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By contrast, it is unlikely that citizens would make a simi-
lar assumption about plain language provisions of the Consti-
tution, which include such ordinary sounding terms as “Equal 
Protection,”130 “liberty,”131 “property,”132 and “Commerce . . . 
among the several States.”133 In some cases, these seemingly 
ordinary terms could still have a technical meaning for legal 
experts. But it is unlikely that members of the general public—
even “reasonable” ones134
Most voters might plausibly assume that seemingly ordi-
nary language in the Constitution should be interpreted in ac-
cordance with everyday usage rather than some technical 
meaning known only to legal experts. The Supreme Court itself 
has emphasized that “[t]he Constitution was written to be un-
derstood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in 
their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical 
meaning.”
—would have understood them in that 
way. 
135 This principle was recently reaffirmed by the 
Court in District of Columbia v. Heller.136
It also seems unlikely that voters would be willing to give 
the experts a blank check to interpret parts of the Constitution 
that implicate major ideologically contested issues. For exam-
ple, it is doubtful that voters in 1787 would have agreed to al-
low legal professionals unconstrained authority to determine 
the scope of federal power under Article I of the Constitution, 
or that the voters of 1868 would have given them similar con-
trol over the determination of what kinds of discrimination are 
forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 If even Supreme 
Court Justices assume that the Constitution was written in or-
dinary language intended to be understood by laypeople, voters 
might well see it that way too. 
It is, of course, theoretically possible that the voters at the 
time of ratification chose to leave constitutional interpretation 
completely to the discretion of legal experts, using whatever 
methods the latter deemed appropriate. But the existence of 
such an extraordinarily high degree of deference to expertise 
 
 130. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 131. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 132. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 133. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 134. For works that claim that original meaning is the meaning understood 
by “reasonable” observers at the time, see sources cited supra note 29. 
 135. United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931). 
 136. 554 U.S. 570, 576–77 (2008). 
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would, at the very least, have to be proven by historical re-
search, not simply assumed. And it is unlikely to have been 
present throughout the ratification of the original Constitution 
and subsequent amendments. Broad deference of this kind may 
be plausible with regards to interpretation of uncontroversial 
technical points, but seems less likely on major substantive is-
sues of the sort that are the focus of the most important contro-
versies over constitutional interpretation. The extent to which 
the public at the time of the Founding and the enactment of the 
post-Civil War amendments was willing to defer to expert opin-
ion on constitutional issues is an important potential topic for 
future research. 
In sum, the issues on which political ignorance is likely to 
be an especially serious problem are often the very ones that 
are most controversial today: cases where the text of the Con-
stitution is imprecise and the issue was not a major focus of 
public discussion at the time of ratification. In these cases, vot-
er ignorance may make it difficult or impossible to determine 
what the original meaning is, or even whether there was a sin-
gle meaning endorsed by the majority of the public at all. 
II.  SOME POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM   
Although the problem of political ignorance creates a seri-
ous challenge for original meaning originalism, there are sev-
eral potential solutions. Here, I review some of the most im-
portant: reliance on elite opinion, deriving the original meaning 
from contemporary media coverage, information shortcuts, and 
a hybrid approach that combines two or more of the above. 
Each of these potential solutions has some merit. But each also 
has important shortcomings. Ultimately, there may not be any 
one solution that fully addresses the issue. There may be some 
situations where the challenge posed by political ignorance is 
insuperable.  
A. RELYING ON THE OPINIONS OF INFORMED ELITES 
The simplest and perhaps most obvious originalist solution 
to the problem of political ignorance is to base interpretations 
of original meaning on the views of informed legal and political 
elites. The elites can be used as proxies for the general public. 
This differs from the strategy of defining original meaning it-
self in terms of the views of a hypothetical well-informed ob-
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server.137
Although no major theorist of originalism has explicitly 
advocated relying on elite opinion exclusively, much originalist 
research relies heavily on elites’ views in practice.
 The latter seeks to ascertain the views of a hypothet-
ical construct, while the former focuses on those of actual well-
informed elites in the real world. In addition, original meaning 
originalists who rely on elite opinion are presumably doing so 
for the purpose of determining the meaning of the Constitution 
for the population as a whole rather than those elites alone. 
138
Some degree of reliance on elite opinion is probably an in-
evitable attribute of originalist jurisprudence. In many cases, 
political elites really do represent public opinion accurately.
 This is un-
derstandable in light of the fact that elites tend to think about 
constitutional meaning in greater depth than ordinary voters 
and leave a far more extensive written record of their opinions.  
139 
As already noted, in some situations the voters might deliber-
ately choose to support an imprecise amendment and then 
leave it to judges and other legal elites to work out the details 
of application.140
However, exclusive or near-exclusive reliance on elite 
views creates serious problems for originalists. One danger is 
that it leaves original meaning vulnerable to the same sorts of 
criticisms that undermined the previously dominant original 
intent version of originalism. The classic attacks on original in-
tent that undermined its reputation in the minds of many ju-
rists and scholars were that it was unworkable because it is 





 137. See supra Part I.A.3. 
 and that the Framers themselves did not want their in-
 138. For well-known recent works of originalist scholarship that rely ex-
tensively on elite interpretations to ascertain original meaning see, for exam-
ple, AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 
(1998); BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 3; BARNETT, RESTORING THE 
LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 2; PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL 
DUTY (2008); RAMSEY, supra note 113; Amar, supra note 3. 
 139. See, e.g., SHMUEL LOCK, CRIME, PUBLIC OPINION, AND CIVIL LIBER-
TIES: THE TOLERANT PUBLIC 54–88 (1999) (showing a variety of surveys 
demonstrating that elites and the public have similar views on many civil lib-
erties issues). 
 140. See McGinnis & Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism, supra note 
1, at 765 (suggesting this possibility). But see supra Part I.A.2 (noting some 
limitations of this argument). 
 141. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understand-
ing, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 229–31 (1980). 
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tentions to be a guide for constitutional interpretation.142 Origi-
nal meaning originalism achieved its present popularity in 
large part because it avoids these problems.143
But if original meaning is determined solely by considering 
the views of contemporary political elites, it would exhibit 
many of the same flaws as original intent after all. Trying to 
ascertain a single coherent interpretation from the views of 
multiple elite commentators risks the same problem of incoher-
ence as trying to meld together the original intentions of multi-
ple Framers.
 
144 Indeed, it may be more difficult, since the com-
mentators probably include a wider range of viewpoints than 
the Framers did. The former are more likely to include oppo-
nents as well as supporters of the constitutional provision at is-
sue. Similarly, if it turns out that the relevant elites believed 
that their views should not guide later judicial interpretations 
of the Constitution,145
Exclusive reliance on elite views also undercuts some of the 
other arguments used to justify original meaning as a norma-
tive theory. For example, some scholars contend that the origi-
nal meaning should guide judicial interpretations of the Consti-
tution because it was adopted through a supermajoritarian 
political process.
 then ignoring this aspect of their inter-
pretive methodology while embracing the general view that 
their views are binding seems contradictory. 
146 However, that may not be true of elite in-
terpretations of the document that are unknown to most of the 
general public. No supermajority ever approved them. Similar-
ly, reliance on elite interpretation is in tension with claims that 
the original meaning is special because it has the legitimacy of 
popular consent to a “public act” of lawmaking at the time of 
enactment.147
 
 142. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original In-
tent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 903–13 (1985). 
 The public cannot be said to have accepted an 
 143. For detailed discussions of these criticisms and the reasons why origi-
nal meaning originalism is not vulnerable to them, see BARNETT, RESTORING 
THE LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 89–100, and Lawrence B. Solum, 
What Is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist Theory 6–17 
(Apr. 28, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1825543, describing the 
rise of original meaning as the dominant school of originalist thought. 
 144. See Brest, supra note 141, at 229–31. 
 145. See Powell, supra note 142, at 903–13. 
 146. See sources cited supra notes 47, 53–54. 
 147. See BORK, supra note 1, at 144–45. 
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elite interpretation of the Constitution of which they were not 
even aware.148
Despite these criticisms, originalists can, to some degree, 
rely on elite views to help ascertain original meaning. In some 
cases, elite views really are a good proxy for public views, and 
the latter may sometimes choose to delegate more technical in-
terpretative issues to the former. For example, survey data 
suggests that public and legal elite opinion on many civil liber-




In many cases, unfortunately, the opinions of knowledgea-
ble elites might differ from those of the general public. Differ-
ences in political knowledge are often highly correlated with 
differing opinions on issues.
 To the extent this was true at the time of the 
Founding, elite opinion could serve as a useful proxy for public 
opinion on these questions. But whether either of these scenar-
ios actually occurred in a particular situation has to be proven 
by evidence, not simply assumed. 
150
Contemporary elite interpretations of the Constitution will 
always be an important resource for originalists. But it is dan-
gerous to place exclusive reliance on them—at least in cases 
where political ignorance makes it unlikely that the elites’ 
views are representative of those of the general public. 
 In other situations, the public 
might simply be unaware of the issues considered by elites. 
When that occurs, there may be no clear original public mean-
ing even if there is a great deal of agreement among legal 
elites. 
B. RELIANCE ON MEDIA COVERAGE AIMED AT THE GENERAL 
PUBLIC 
If elites are not always a reliable guide to understanding 
the public, why not look at information available in media di-
rected at the ordinary voter? Newspapers and other publica-
tions intended to be read by the general public may provide a 
better guide to voters’ understanding of the Constitution at the 
time of enactment than the statements of well-informed elites. 
In an important recent article, George C. Thomas III advocates 
precisely this strategy and uses extensive evidence from con-
 
 148. A possible exception could be a case where the public trusts elites to 
come up with an interpretation to such an extent that they do not check to see 
what the result was. 
 149. See LOCK, supra note 139, at 35–58 (describing the relevant evidence). 
 150. See sources cited supra note 10. 
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temporary newspapers to shed interesting light on the perenni-
al question of whether or not the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to incorpo-
rate the Bill of Rights against the states.151
Contemporaneous media accounts can indeed be a useful 
resource for originalists, and more scholars should emulate 
Thomas’s research strategy. Modern databases make it possible 
to search a much wider range of nineteenth-century newspa-
pers in a short period of time than was possible in the past.
 
152
But it would be a mistake to assume that most of the pub-
lic is necessarily aware of information published in the media. 
Modern survey research shows that the majority of the public is 
often ignorant of basic facts that received extensive media cov-
erage.
 
153 Many such examples could be cited.154
Media interpretations may also fail to accurately represent 
public opinion for a different reason: reporters and editors often 
hold views on political and legal issues that vary greatly from 
those of the general population. Over the last several decades, 
survey research and content analysis strongly suggests that the 
majority of editors and reporters are significantly more liberal 
than the average of the general population.
 Political igno-
rance often extends even to relatively basic matters that 
knowledgeable insiders take for granted. It is likely to be even 
more severe on detailed points of constitutional interpretation 
that are controversial among scholars and jurists. 
155
 
 151. George C. Thomas III, Newspapers and the Fourteenth Amendment: 
What Did the American Public Know About Section 1?, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
ISSUES 323, 353–59 (2009). Michael Kent Curtis previously made more limited 
use of newspaper sources to address the same question. See MICHAEL KENT 
CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE 
BILL OF RIGHTS 132–35 (1986); Michael Kent Curtis, Historical Linguistics, 
Inkblots, and Life After Death: The Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of the 
United States, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1071, 1137–38 (2000). 
 Whether media 
opinion diverged from public opinion to a comparable degree in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is far less clear. We do 
not have systematic quantitative survey data on either elite or 
 152. See Thomas, supra note 151, at 323–27 (describing the relevant data-
bases and noting that they include thousands of different publications). 
 153. See examples discussed supra Part I.C.1. 
 154. See SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 10, at 
ch. 1 (listing many examples); see also DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 
10, at 70−71 (same). 
 155. See, e.g., TIM GROSECLOSE, LEFT TURN (2011) (presenting evidence 
that the media today is more liberal than the general population); S. ROBERT 
LICHTER ET AL., THE MEDIA ELITE 20−53 (1986) (discussing survey evidence 
for reporters in the 1970s and 1980s). 
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public opinion during those periods.156
Diverging ideologies will not necessarily lead members of 
the media to interpret the Constitution differently from ordi-
nary citizens. Some issues are so clear that any reasonably in-
telligent observer will come to the same conclusion. In other 
cases, reporters and citizens might be able to resist the effects 
of ideological predispositions and come to more objective judg-
ments. Nonetheless, ideology often does have an influence on 
constitutional interpretation, and members of the media are no 
more immune to its effects than lawyers, judges, and academ-
ics.
 But we should at least be 
aware of the possibility. 
157
Despite these limitations, media evidence is a useful source 
of data that originalist scholars are only beginning to fully ex-
ploit. Some of its potential shortcomings can potentially be 
remedied through more careful research. For example, the 
problem of ideological bias can be mitigated by looking for are-
as of agreement between media sources that have different po-
litical biases. Cases where both Republican and Democratic 
newspapers agreed on the meaning of an important provision of 
the Fourteenth Amendment qualify as more powerful evidence 
than ones where partisans of the two sides differed. Ideological 
bias is also more easily detectable in nineteenth-century media, 
an era when most newspapers were openly identified with a po-
litical party.  
  
Nonetheless, there is no clear way to solve the problem of 
cases where information that is widely available in the media 
nonetheless fails to penetrate the consciousness of most of the 
public. In such situations, media evidence may well be an unre-
liable guide to the beliefs of the general population.  
C. INFORMATION SHORTCUTS 
Some scholars claim that political ignorance is relatively 
unimportant because even comparatively ignorant voters can 
use “information shortcuts” to offset their lack of knowledge.158
 
 156. See GEER, supra note 
 
74, at 2−5 (describing the lack of public opinion 
polls prior to the 1930s). 
 157. For evidence of ideological effects on judicial interpretation, see, for 
example, SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 52, passim. 
 158. See, e.g., JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES?: A SECOND LOOK 171−76 
(2011); VINCENT L. HUTCHINGS, PUBLIC OPINION AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNT-
ABILITY: HOW CITIZENS LEARN ABOUT POLITICS 11 (2003); ARTHUR LUPIA & 
MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS LEARN 
WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? 13 (1998); PAGE & SHAPIRO, supra note 79, at 
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Such shortcuts enable generally ignorant voters to use small 
bits of information as a substitute for larger bodies of 
knowledge. Possible shortcuts include deriving information 
from party identification (where a candidate’s policies can be 
inferred from those of his party),159 reliance on better-informed 
“opinion leaders,”160 “retrospective voting” by which voters can 
gauge a party’s or candidate’s future performance based on 
their past record,161 and others.162
Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that shortcuts fully solved 
the problem or came close to doing so. Elsewhere, I have argued 
that information shortcuts are often insufficient to make up for 
ignorance of basic political information, and in some cases may 
even make the problem worse.
 So far, there have not been 
any studies of the extent to which voters may have used infor-
mation shortcuts to try to determine the meaning of the origi-
nal Constitution or major amendments at the time of enact-
ment. We therefore do not know to what degree such shortcuts 
may have offset the effects of political ignorance. 
163 Even most of the more opti-
mistic research on shortcuts does not claim that shortcuts ena-
ble voters to understand complex, nuanced issues in a sophisti-
cated way.164
 
1−37 (proposing that the shortcuts individuals take in gathering knowledge 
still lead to a rational public opinion); SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE REASONING 
VOTER 44−72 (1991) (examining shortcuts voters take in evaluating, obtaining, 
and storing information to fill gaps in knowledge); DONALD A. WITTMAN, THE 
MYTH OF DEMOCRATIC FAILURE 12−14 (1995) (arguing that informed judg-
ments can be made with little information); Philip E. Converse, Popular Rep-
resentation and the Distribution of Information, in INFORMATION AND DEMO-
CRATIC PROCESSES 369, 382 (John A. Ferejohn & James Kuklinski eds., 1990). 
 Rather, they contend that these shortcuts help 
voters get a basic understanding of the issues at stake and 
 159. See, e.g., ALDRICH, supra note 158, at 176 (discussing how the goals, 
policies, and records of parties lead to a sense of partisan identification). 
 160. See, e.g., HUTCHINGS, supra note 158, at 30−31 (discussing media cov-
erage and the possibility of constituents relying on other elites, such as politi-
cal challengers or interest group leaders); LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 
158, at 184−201 ( arguing that reliance on opinion leaders is a useful infor-
mation shortcut). 
 161. See generally MORRIS P. FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN 
AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS 6–11 (1981) (presenting a classic account of 
this idea).  
 162. For a review and critique of many different shortcut mechanisms, see 
SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 10, at ch. 4. 
 163. See id.; Somin, supra note 64, at 9−15. 
 164. See, e.g., POPKIN, supra note 158, at 71 (listing limitations and broad 
assumptions that information shortcuts require). 
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make a reasonably informed choice between competing candi-
dates in an election.165
Information shortcuts might enable voters to understand 
some basic aspects of various constitutional provisions at the 
time of enactment. For example, they could use shortcuts to 
deduce that the original Constitution gave Congress greater 
powers to regulate, tax, and spend than it possessed under the 
Articles of Confederation, or that the Fourteenth Amendment 
was “designed to assure to the colored race the enjoyment of all 
the civil rights that under the law are enjoyed by white per-
sons.”
 
166 But this is a far cry from being able to use shortcuts to 
determine what sorts of activities Article I of the Constitution 
allows Congress to regulate, or understand the implications of 
the Fourteenth Amendment for state discrimination on nonra-
cial grounds. It may also not have been enough to enable voters 
to determine what rights actually qualify as civil rights pro-
tected by the Amendment, as opposed to political and social 
rights that perhaps were not.167
In addition, information shortcuts are likely to be less use-
ful with respect to issues that were not a central focus of public 
debate at the time the relevant constitutional provision was 
ratified. Parties, opinion leaders, and other sources of infor-
mation shortcuts were less likely to take clear positions on such 
low-visibility issues, and voters are therefore less likely to pick 
up on them. The more complex the issue in question and the 
less it was a major focus of contention at the time of ratifica-
tion, the less likely it is that voters would have successfully 
used information shortcuts to determine the implications of the 
provision for that issue. 
  
While we do not have scientific survey data on voter 
knowledge and the use of information shortcuts in 1787, 1791 
or 1868, there is some partially relevant, more-recent evidence 
from studies of voter performance on state constitutional refer-
endum initiatives. Some studies claim that relatively ignorant 
voters can effectively leverage information shortcuts to vote in 
accordance with their policy preferences on such initiatives.168
 
 165. See sources cited supra note 
 
158. 
 166. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1880). 
 167. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 367 (1880) (Field, J., dissenting) 
(distinguishing between these three and claiming that the Amendment pro-
tects only “civil rights,” which did not include, in his view, the right to serve on 
a jury). 
 168. See, e.g., THOMAS CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY 87−89 (1999) (conclud-
ing that voter competence in initiatives is not as good as would be desirable, 
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Others are much more pessimistic, concluding that political ig-
norance often skews voter decisions.169 But even the more opti-
mistic scholars do not claim that voters understand the de-
tailed implications of ballot initiatives or their potential impact 
on issues that go beyond those that were the central focus of 
public debate at the time of the vote. Rather, they claim that 
voters can use shortcuts to make a roughly accurate decision 
about whether or not voting in favor of the initiative will pro-
mote their policy preferences or not.170
This is a long way from the more complex interpretive is-
sues that are the focus of many debates over original meaning. 
An 1868 voter using such information shortcuts might correctly 
conclude that the Fourteenth Amendment is preferable to the 
preexisting status quo because he generally favors giving re-
cently freed slaves greater legal protections. But that does not 
mean he would have any idea of the full range of rights that 
might be protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the 
full extent to which the Equal Protection Clause forbids racial 
discrimination, or its implications for laws that discriminate on 
the basis of other characteristics, such as gender or homosexu-
ality. 
  
Moreover, both the original Constitution and several of the 
most important amendments differ from referendum initiatives 
in a crucial way that increases the knowledge burden on voters. 
 
but still relatively strong); Craig M. Burnett et al., The Dilemma of Direct De-
mocracy, 9 ELECTION L.J. 305, 317 (2010) (“[U]ninformed voters appear to 
make decisions that are indistinguishable from voters who have knowledge of 
key facts and voters who have knowledge of a voting cue.”); Arthur Lupia, 
Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in Califor-
nia Insurance Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63, 72 (1994) (conclud-
ing that uninformed voters effectively emulate those who are well-informed). 
 169. See, e.g., Thad Kousser & Mathew D. McCubbins, Social Choice, Cryp-
to-Initiatives, and Policymaking by Direct Democracy, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 949, 
961−65 (2005) (concluding that voters often ignore relevant tradeoffs and con-
text); Shauna Reilly & Sean Richey, Ballot Question Readability and Roll-Off: 
The Impact of Language Complexity, 64 POL. RES. Q. 59, 66 (2009) (concluding 
that most ballot questions are too complex for the majority of voters to under-
stand); Craig M. Burnett, Informed Democracy? How Voter Knowledge of Ini-
tiatives Influences Consistent Voting 16−17 (undated) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://www.olemiss.edu/depts/political_science/state_ 
politics/conferences/2009/papers/20.pdf (finding low levels of cue knowledge 
and little evidence of such knowledge affecting vote choice in ballot-initiative 
elections); Christopher S. Elmendorf & David Schleicher, Informing Consent 
30−31 (UC Davis Legal Studies Res. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 285, 
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2010115 (reviewing recent pessi-
mistic literature on this issue).  
 170. See sources cited supra note 168. 
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In many states, the range of issues covered by a referendum in-
itiative is limited by the “single subject rule,” which prevents a 
ballot question from addressing more than one issue at a 
time.171 Although the merits of this rule are debatable,172
By contrast, the original Constitution, the Bill of Rights, 
and the Fourteenth Amendment all addressed a wide range of 
issues simultaneously, many of them complex and multifaceted. 
The 1787 Constitution allocates numerous different powers to 
Congress, establishes the structure of the executive and the ju-
diciary, and addresses a variety of other issues as well. The Bill 
of Rights includes many different rights, from freedom of 
speech, to property rights, to criminal procedure. And the Four-
teenth Amendment has several complex and open-ended claus-
es, such as the Equal Protection Clause and the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause. This variety and complexity makes it less 
likely that voters dedicated the time and effort to considering 
all of the relevant issues, or indeed any beyond a small fraction 
of them. 
 it does 
at least somewhat reduce the amount of information voters 
need to understand any given initiative.  
Another relevant body of evidence is my own earlier work 
testing Bruce Ackerman’s claim that voters increase their 
knowledge levels during constitutional moments—periods of 
constitutional change that may operate outside the Article V 
process.173 Unlike in the case of 1787 and 1868, Ackerman’s 
theory is subject to testing by survey evidence, since one of his 
three major constitutional moments is the New Deal constitu-
tional revolution of the 1930s, a period that coincided with the 
rise of modern public opinion polling.174 My article demonstrat-
ed that political knowledge levels generally remained low dur-
ing the relevant period and that some of the major New Deal-
era changes in constitutional legal doctrine probably lacked 
majority public support.175
Neither state constitutional referenda nor the 1930s con-
stitutional moment are perfect analogues for the events of 1787 
and 1868. It is possible that voters pay less attention to state 
constitutional change than federal because the stakes are usu-
 
 
 171. Robert D. Cooter & Michael D. Gilbert, A Theory of Direct Democracy 
and the Single Subject Rule, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 704−09 (2010). 
 172. See id. at 709−12 (describing opposing arguments). 
 173. See Somin, supra note 37. 
 174. See id. at 620. 
 175. Id. at 620−63. 
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ally lower. It is also possible that public knowledge levels were 
higher in 1787 or 1868 than in the 1930s.176
At the same time, it is notable that both types of evidence 
seem to support the conclusion that voter ignorance is often a 
serious problem when constitutional changes are under consid-
eration. It is also worth reiterating that some of the differences 
between constitutional referenda and the New Deal period on 
the one hand, and 1787 and 1868 on the other imply that politi-
cal knowledge may have been higher during the later period. 
Modern media made it easier to acquire political information 
today and—to a lesser extent—in the 1930s than in the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries. And the limited scope of refer-
endum initiatives imposes a lower knowledge burden on voters 
than did the sweeping constitutional transformations of the 
Founding and Reconstruction periods. 
 It is even possible 
that voters paid more attention to constitutional issues because 
the use of the formal amendment process alerted them to the 
fact that constitutional change was on the table. The constitu-
tional stakes may have been more ambiguous in the 1930s, 
when the relevant change occurred outside the bounds of Arti-
cle V. The evidence from these two sources is necessarily sug-
gestive rather than definitive.  
Despite my skepticism about the possibility that infor-
mation shortcuts can solve the problem of political ignorance 
with respect to original meaning, this is an issue that requires 
greater study. Scholars have conducted only very limited re-
search on the extent of public knowledge about constitutional 
change in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.177
Unfortunately, the necessary research will be difficult to 
conduct because of the absence of scientific public opinion sur-
veys prior to the 1930s. Scholars will therefore have to rely on 
 It is pos-
sible that future scholarship will discover that voters used in-
formation shortcuts to assess the meaning of various provisions 
of the Constitution on least some important issues. These may 
include some where effective use of such shortcuts seems ini-
tially unlikely. 
 
 176. See supra Part I.C.2 (discussing differences between those eras and 
the modern period). 
 177. See discussion in supra Part I.C.2. 
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more anecdotal data, such as diaries, political communications 
targeted at lay audiences, and others.178
D. HYBRID STRATEGIES 
 
Reliance on elite accounts, evidence from contemporary 
media, and information shortcuts all have significant shortcom-
ings as potential solutions to the challenge of political igno-
rance for originalists. But it is possible that a hybrid approach 
that makes use of all three strategies simultaneously might do 
better. For example, an interpretation of a constitutional provi-
sion that is supported by both elite statements and contempo-
rary media accounts is more likely to be an accurate description 
of what the general public believed than a theory that is sup-
ported by only one of these two types of evidence. The theory 
becomes even stronger if it is also backed by evidence suggest-
ing that voters became aware of it by using information 
shortcuts.  
To some extent, the differing methodologies may compen-
sate for each other’s weaknesses. For example, one of the short-
comings of relying on elite interpretations alone is that elites 
often rely on information that is unknown to most of the gen-
eral public.179
Since research on the relationship between original mean-
ing and political ignorance is only beginning, it is likely that 
new approaches to the problem will emerge. Both law profes-
sors and scholars from other disciplines, such as economics, 
history, and political science, may have much to contribute on 
this score. 
 Media evidence can partly remedy that flaw be-
cause press accounts are usually geared to the ordinary layper-
son rather than knowledgeable elites. Moreover, an 
interpretation that is advanced by a broad cross-section of both 
elites and the media is more likely to be picked up by “rational-
ly ignorant” voters than one that is promoted by only one of 
these sources.  
At the same time, there may well be important cases where 
the challenge of political ignorance is insuperable. Given wide-
spread political ignorance on even fairly basic issues, it is quite 
possible that there are some important constitutional questions 
on which there is no original meaning because most of the pub-
 
 178. For an important example of research on nineteenth-century public 
opinion utilizing such sources, see ALTSCHULER & BLUMIN, RUDE REPUBLIC, 
supra note 89, passim. 
 179. See supra Part II.A. 
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lic was simply unaware of either the question or the possible 
answers to it. Indeed, historical research into particular issues 
might actually reinforce such a conclusion by providing addi-
tional evidence in support of it. Some issues may even have 
been deliberately ignored by political elites or the media for the 
purposes of avoiding public attention. A rationally ignorant 
public might be more vulnerable to such manipulation than one 
that is better-informed.180
III.  MODIFYING AND LIMITING ORIGINALISM   
 
Instead of seeking to solve the problem of political igno-
rance within the confines of existing theories of original mean-
ing, advocates of originalism could instead address it by modi-
fying the theories themselves or limiting their scope. The 
former might be achieved by interpreting ambiguous parts of 
the Constitution in ways that are more literal and intuitive; the 
latter by relying less on interpretation and more on construc-
tion. 
Given widespread political ignorance, it is arguable that 
originalists are more likely to find a consensus original mean-
ing by using literal and intuitive, rather than metaphorical, 
meanings of disputed phrases. A literal meaning is more likely 
to be understood by a casual reader of the text who has little 
knowledge of the political or legal controversies that led to an 
amendment. For example, there is a longstanding debate over 
whether the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment should 
be interpreted to restrict the power of eminent domain to cases 
of literal “public use”—where the condemned property is owned 
by the government or the public has a legal right of access to 
it—or figurative “uses” such as transfers to private parties that 
provide a public benefit.181 While it is possible that a sophisti-
cated legal interpreter at the time of the Founding would have 
interpreted public use to mean any sort of public benefit,182
 
 180. For the argument that public ignorance increases vulnerability to ma-
nipulation, see SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 
 this 
10, 
at ch. 3. 
 181. This longstanding debate was most recently considered by the United 
States Supreme Court in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
Justice Clarence Thomas presented originalist arguments for the literal view. 
Id. at 507−11 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The majority endorsed the figurative 
view. Id. at 473−78.  
 182. See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the 
Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 859−80 
(1995) (defending this claim). 
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seems unlikely in the case of a less knowledgeable member of 
the general public. 
Obviously, preferring literal meanings to figurative ones is 
not a panacea. In some cases, there may be more than one pos-
sible literal meaning of a particular clause of the Constitution. 
In others, resort to the literal meaning may simply not be 
enough to answer the question of how the clause applies to the 
problem at hand. For example, nothing in the literal meaning 
of “equal protection of the laws” gives us an answer to the ques-
tion of whether the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment forbids state discrimination on the basis of gen-
der.183 To answer that question from an originalist perspective, 
we would have to look to other kinds of evidence.184
Even with a presumption in favor of literal meanings, 
there are likely to be cases where political ignorance makes it 
difficult or impossible to establish any clear original meaning. 
Originalists could try to address some of these hard cases by re-
lying more on construction rather than interpretation of the 
text.
 Finally, in 
some cases, it is possible that most of the public really did un-
derstand and endorse a figurative meaning rather than a lit-
eral one. Widespread political ignorance reduces the likelihood 
of such an outcome. But it certainly does not make it impossi-
ble. At most, therefore, the preference for literal meanings 
should be a presumption rather than a rigid rule. And even the 
presumption is only a tentative suggestion. Although it could 
help address the problem posed by political ignorance, it might 
suffer from other weaknesses that outweigh this potential ad-
vantage.  
185 As Randy Barnett puts it, “[c]onstitutional construction 
fills the inevitable gaps created by the vagueness of [the] . . . 
words [of the text] when applied to particular circumstances.”186
 
 183. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 
Taking due account of political ignorance might lead to the con-
clusion that there are more gaps in the original meaning than 
 184. See, e.g., Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 1, passim (surveying that 
evidence). 
 185. For originalist scholarship explicating this distinction, see, for exam-
ple, BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 3, at 3−6, 104−05; BARNETT, 
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 118−3 0; KEITH E. 
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CON-
STITUTIONAL MEANING (1999); Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-
Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010). 
 186. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 100. 
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we would like to believe. If so, more analytical heavy lifting 
may have to be done by construction and less by interpretation. 
This might well be a perfectly acceptable result. But it has 
two potential downsides from an originalist perspective. One is 
that fewer constitutional problems will be solved by analysis of 
original meaning and more by other means. Resorting to con-
struction might shore up originalism’s theoretical underpin-
nings. But this gain would come at the cost of making 
originalism less useful for addressing real-world constitutional 
controversies. More of the heavy lifting needed to resolve these 
issues would be done by construction and less by the original 
meaning of the text. 
Second, greater reliance on construction diminishes one of 
the potential advantages of originalism: the possibility that it 
will give us determinate answers to disputed constitutional 
questions and limit judicial discretion. If the original meaning 
leaves numerous gaps for courts to fill in by applying construc-
tion, there are likely to be more opportunities for judges to 
make decisions on the basis of their own ideological or political 
preferences.187
  CONCLUSION   
 
The reality of widespread political ignorance poses a seri-
ous challenge for original meaning originalism, a theory that 
has attracted widespread support among constitutional theo-
rists. In some cases, there may not be any clear original mean-
ing of a constitutional provision because a rationally ignorant 
electorate simply did not know about the issue. In others, pub-
lic ignorance may make the original meaning more difficult to 
discern. These difficulties are particularly acute with respect to 
constitutional issues that are complex in nature or were not 
widely discussed at the time of ratification. Many of the most 
hotly contested modern constitutional questions fall into one or 
both of these categories. 
Originalists can resort to a variety of strategies in order to 
address these problems. These include relying on interpreta-
tions of the Constitution by knowledgeable elites, focusing on 
media accounts, and investigating the possibility that even rel-
atively ignorant voters could grasp the issue in question by re-
lying on information shortcuts. They can also modify their the-
 
 187. For this type of objection to the use of construction, see McGinnis & 
Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism, supra note 1, at 675−79. 
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ories by preferring literal to figurative interpretations of consti-
tutional text, and relying more on construction rather than in-
terpretation. Yet each of these approaches has drawbacks. 
Even in combination, they may not be able to solve all or even 
most of the hard cases that bedevil scholars and judges. 
The existence of such insuperable cases need not be a 
death blow to original meaning originalism. The methodology 
does not have to give us the answer to all difficult constitution-
al questions in order to be useful. Moreover, its shortcomings 
must be weighed against the flaws of rival theories, originalist 
and otherwise. Both living constitution theories and alternative 
accounts of originalism have weaknesses of their own. 
Greater reliance on construction and literal meanings are 
not the only possible ways to deal with cases where the original 
meaning is indeterminate because of political ignorance. They 
may not even be the best. Fuller consideration of the possible 
alternatives is a task for another article. There is probably no 
single magic bullet that will resolve the dilemma once and for 
all. But the beginning of wisdom is to increase our knowledge of 
the challenge posed by ignorance. 
 
 
